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Summary box
What is already known?
 ► The government of Kenya has embarked on a high-
ly ambitious reform programme that aims to pro-
vide access to higher levels health facilities free 
of charge. The first phase of the Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) agenda is currently being piloted in 
four Kenyan counties and national rollout is planned 
by 2022.
What are the new findings?
 ► The incidence of catastrophic payments is more 
severe for the poorest households and in the rural 
areas and outpatient services are the main driver of 
catastrophic payments.
 ► Socioeconomic conditions, the presence of elderly 
in the household and of people affected by chronic 
conditions are key characteristics associated with 
the probability of incurring OOP expenditures.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Through the removal of user fees, the ongoing UHC 
agenda is expected to increase access to inpatient 
services and this may lead to a raising number of 
people experiencing catastrophic expenditure as 
well as higher poverty due to the high costs of in-
patient care.
 ► Consequently, it is important that efforts to expand 
access to care are accompanied with interventions 
to protect citizens against catastrophic expenditure.
AbSTrACT
Introduction Progress towards effective service coverage 
and financial protection—the two dimensions of Universal 
Health Coverage (UHC)—has been limited in Kenya in the 
last decade. The government of Kenya has embarked on a 
highly ambitious reform programme currently being piloted 
in four Kenyan counties and aiming at national rollout 
by 2022. This study provides an updated assessment of 
the performance of the Kenyan health system in terms 
of financial protection allowing to monitor trends over 
time. In light of the UHC initiative, the study provides a 
baseline to assess the impact of the UHC pilot programme 
and inform scale- up plans. It also investigates household 
characteristics associated with catastrophic payments.
Methods Using data from the Kenya Household Health 
Expenditure and Utilization Survey (KHHEUS) 2018, we 
investigated the incidence and intensity of catastrophic 
and impoverishing health expenditure. We used a logistic 
regression analysis to assess households’ characteristics 
associated with the probability of incurring catastrophic 
health expenditures.
results The results show that the incidence of 
catastrophic payments is more severe for the poorest 
households and in the rural areas and mainly due to 
outpatient services. Results for the impoverishing effect 
suggest that after accounting for out- of- pocket(OOP) 
payments, the proportion of poor people increases by 2.2 
percentage points in both rural and urban areas. Thus, 
between 1 and 1.1 million individuals are pushed into 
poverty due to OOP payments. Among the characteristics 
associated with the probability of incurring OOP 
expenditures, socioeconomic conditions, the presence 
of elderly and of people affected by chronic conditions 
showed significant results.
Conclusion Kenya is still lagging behind in terms of 
protecting its citizens against financial risks associated 
with ill health and healthcare seeking behaviour. More 
effort is needed to protect the most vulnerable population 
groups from the high costs of illness.
bACkground
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) refers 
to a situation where all people can obtain 
needed health services at a good level of 
quality without suffering undue financial 
hardship.1–3 When healthcare systems fail to 
financially protect care seekers, entire house-
holds can be pushed or trapped into poverty 
or experience catastrophic expenditure due 
to payments required to receive needed 
health services. While this is a fundamental 
requirement of UHC, guaranteeing financial 
protection has proven to be a particularly 
daunting challenge across most countries but 
especially so in resource constrained settings 
where prepayment mechanism are not well 
developed.4 A recent study conducted across 
133 countries found that in 2010 more than 
808 million people incurred catastrophic 
health expenditure5 and 122 million people 
were pushed into poverty.6 Between 2000 and 
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2010 the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure 
increased from 9.7 per cent to 11.7 per cent, proving the 
lack of progress on financial protection. While health 
service coverage has been increasing as investments in 
UHC are being scaled up, the financing mechanisms 
have not been effective in equally improving on financial 
protection. Recent evidence showed that countries with 
a higher percentage of total health expenditure prepaid 
through taxes or mandatory contributions perform 
better in terms of financial protection than those relying 
on voluntary premiums and contribution.5 6
Despite significant progress towards achieving UHC in 
many low- income and middle- income countries, substan-
tial challenges remain in terms of access to quality health-
care and lack of financial protection.7 8 This is also the 
case in Kenya, where sustained efforts and policy inter-
ventions have led to limited progress towards UHC. In 
the last decade, the government of Kenya has also identi-
fied UHC as a critical policy area in the Vision 2030 long- 
term development plan. The same goals are echoed in 
the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and the Kenya Health 
Policy 2014–2030.9 In the same spirit, a series of health 
financing policies reducing, waiving or removing user fees 
for selected healthcare services have been implemented 
in Kenya since the 1980s.10–12 Noteworthy reforms imple-
mented by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
in the last decade include: the introduction of the Civil 
Servants Scheme for formal sector government workers 
and their dependents, the expansion of the basic benefit 
package for NHIF members, the increase of the NHIF 
inpatient reimbursement rate, and the introduction of a 
Health Insurance Subsidy for the poor.13
However, recent data suggest that progress towards the 
two dimensions of UHC–effective service coverage and 
financial protection–has been limited. Over a 10- year 
period from 2003 to 2013 the combined UHC indi-
cator increased slowly from 44 per cent to 52 per cent.14 
During the same period, the incidence of catastrophic 
health expenditure seems to have declined but it remains 
significantly high. While estimates of catastrophic health 
expenditures in Kenya are sensitive to the methodology 
used,15 all studies attest to the risk of becoming poor (or 
poorer, for families already poor) as a result of health 
expenses. Using data from 2007, the level of catastrophic 
health expenditure was found to range between 9.8 per 
cent16 and 14.8 per cent17 of the households, depending 
on different methodological choices. The most recent 
analysis from 2013 estimated that the percentage of 
households that incurred catastrophic health expen-
ditures was 4.5 per cent,18 suggesting that more intense 
efforts are needed in order to protect Kenyans against 
financial hardship from health expenditure. All the 
results reported refer to indicators computed using direct 
healthcare payments as numerator and 40% of non- food 
expenditures as threshold. As in many other African 
countries, Kenya’s efforts to increase the percentage of 
people covered through voluntary contributions have 
had a limited impact. Recent estimates show health 
insurance coverage has increased from 10 per cent in 
2007 to 20 per cent in 2018, a positive although insuffi-
ciently accelerated trend.19
In a radical shift from this piecemeal approach to health 
system improvement, in 2018 the Kenyan Government 
has embarked on a highly ambitious reform programme 
(the Big 4 Action Plan), committing to expand UHC to 
the entire Kenyan population by 2022.20 The new reform 
started in December 2018 and is currently being piloted 
in four counties—Kisumu (Kenya’s third largest county), 
Nyeri (second richest county with a GDP per capita of 
$1503), Machakos (10th richest with a GDP per capita 
of $913), and Isiolo (one of the poorest counties with 
a poverty incidence of about two- thirds of the popula-
tion). The reform foresees the elimination of user fees 
at higher levels of the health sector (health facilities level 
IV and V) in an effort to further increase access to care 
and reduce medical out- of- pocket expenses for Kenyan 
households by half before full implementation in 2022.
On this backdrop, our analysis sets out to provide an 
updated assessment of the performance of the Kenyan 
health sector in terms of financial protection. This 
manuscript focuses on assessing impoverishing and 
catastrophic health expenditure in Kenya using data 
collected after the abolition of user fees in health centres 
and dispensaries and the increased coverage of NHIF. In 
this manuscript we assess the catastrophic effects of OOP 
healthcare expenditure using two different consumption 
thresholds and we compute the impoverishment effects 
due to OOP healthcare expenditure for Kenya as a whole 
and for the four selected counties where the pilot UHC 
programme is being implemented. Finally, we also inves-
tigate household characteristics associated with cata-
strophic payments. This study provides two important 
contributions: first, it allows to continuously monitor 
trends in financial protection in Kenya, and second, it 
provides a baseline to assess the impact of the UHC pilot 
programme and inform scale- up plans.
MeTHodS
data source
We use data from the fourth KHHEUS collected by the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in April and May 
2018. The dataset contains sociodemographic, economic 
and health related information at the individual and 
household level. The survey includes questions on utili-
sation of inpatient care (over the last 12 months) and 
outpatient care (over the last 4 weeks), health insur-
ance coverage, and a detailed description of house-
holds’ expenditures. Previous KHHEUS surveys were 
conducted in 2003, 2007 and 2013. The survey used a 
two- stages sampling approach. In the first stage 1500 clus-
ters were selected, and in the second stage 25 households 
for each cluster. Therefore, it includes 37 500 households 
and it is designed to be representative both at national 
and county level.21
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Patient and public involvement statement
Patients were not directly involved in this study. Only 
secondary data were used for the analyses.
Methods
We estimate the incidence and intensity of catastrophic 
expenditure and investigate the implications for poverty 
using well- established methodologies described by Wagstaff 
and van Doorslaer,22 Xu et al23 and O'Donnell et al.24
The definition of OOP used to compute all indicators is 
the sum of transport costs to reach the health facility, user 
fees and any other direct payments made by individuals 
of the same household to the healthcare providers, net of 
any reimbursements from the insurance or subsidy from 
the government. We considered only the cash payments 
not reimbursed by any health insurance scheme. In online 
supplementary material 1 we reported the same indicators 
computed in the main text but using a different defini-
tion of OOP, namely considering only direct payments as 
nominator (excluding transport costs). Nevertheless, the 
inclusion or exclusion of transport costs does not show any 
remarkable difference.
Measuring the incidence and intensity of catastrophic healthcare 
expenditure
We first measure the incidence of OOP payments defined 
as the ratio between the healthcare expenditures and the 
total (or non- food) expenditure of the household. We then 
estimate the catastrophic headcount (HC) which repre-
sents the percentage of people whose OOP payments are 
higher than a selected threshold. In alignment with the 
World Bank approach, we consider two poverty thresholds 
and compare the results: 10 per cent of total expenditure 
and 40 per cent of non- food expenditures (defined also 
as ‘consumption expenditure’). This indicator is a very 
rough measure of catastrophic expenditure, and unable 
to give information on the intensity of the OOP expend-
iture. To overcome this limitation, we compute the cata-
strophic payment overshoot (O) which measures the 
amount by which OOP payments of the household exceed 
the threshold of reference. We then adjust the catastrophic 
HC and catastrophic payment overshoot (O) indicators for 
differences in socioeconomic status to reflect the fact that 
opportunity costs of catastrophic health expenditures are 
higher for a poor household compared with a rich one. The 
method used to reflect the difference in opportunity costs 
consists in multiplying the payment overshoot (O) and the 
HC index by the complement of the respective concentra-
tion index (CI).22 In our analysis we apply the Erreygers 
correction to the CI to account for the fact that the variable 
of interest is binary and avoid biased estimates.25 26
Measuring the impoverishing effects of health care expenditures
We compute standard indices measuring impoverishment, 
that is, the poverty HC, the poverty gap and the normalised 
poverty gap22. The poverty HC indicates the percentage 
of people below the poverty line. We considered the 
Kenyan national poverty line of Kenya shillings (Ksh) 3252 
(US$32.5) in rural areas and of Ksh 5995 (US$59.9) in 
urban areas.21 The poverty gap measures the magnitude 
of the individual deficit and is computed as the difference 
between the poverty line and the individual income. We 
used total household expenditures as a proxy for house-
hold income. Given that KHHEUS database is set at the 
household level, to obtain a proxy for individual income we 
correct the household income using the Anzagi- Bernard 
equivalence scale.27 This scale assigns a value of unity to 
people aged 15 years and above, a weight of 0.65 to chil-
dren aged 5–14 and 0.24 to children 0–4 years.21
Finally, the normalised prepayment poverty gap, 
defined as the ratio between the poverty gap and the 
poverty line, allows for cross- country comparison.
We calculate the same indicators for the prehealth and 
posthealth payment income and compute the measures of 
poverty impact of OOP payments as the difference between 
the prepayment and postpayment indicators. To express 
poverty indicators at the individual level, we rescale the 
results at household level using a weight obtained multi-
plying the sample weight by the household size.24
All the indicators are disaggregated by type of service 
(outpatient and inpatient), as well as by urban/rural 
areas and income quintiles to better take into account 
the heterogeneity effects.
Measuring the determinants of catastrophic healthcare 
expenditures
To assess what household characteristics are associated with 
the probability of incurring catastrophic expenditures, we 
carry out a multilevel logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether the household experienced catastrophic health 
expenditures. We included the cluster as second level of 
the model and the household as first level. We consider 
both definitions of thresholds: OOP payments over 10 per 
cent of the total expenditure budget and over 40 per cent 
of non- food expenditure.
The explanatory variables of the model, similar to related 
literature,18 28 29 include a set of characteristics of the head 
of the household (age, gender, level of education, marital 
status, employment status), and a set of characteristics of the 
household, including the presence of at least one member 
enrolled into a health insurance scheme, total consump-
tion expenditure in quintiles, household size, presence of 
chronic illness in the household, area of residence (urban/
rural), presence of elderly people (aged 60 and more). The 
empirical analyses were performed in Stata V.14.
reSulTS
out-of-pocket payments
Table 1 outlines the average OOP expenditures broken 
down by expenditure quintiles and residential area. The 
average OOP payments was Ksh 5613 for outpatient treat-
ments, Ksh 1492 for inpatient treatments and Ksh 7990 for 
both types of treatment. Among the subsample of health-
care seekers the average expenditure was Ksh 15 409 for 
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Figure 1 Mean OOP payments as a share of total 
household expenditure by income quintiles.
Table 1 Mean annual OOP payments, by income quintiles and residential area, Kenya
Outpatient Inpatient Total
All 
households
Only 
households 
reporting 
outpatient OOP 
expenditures
All 
households
Only 
households 
reporting 
inpatient OOP 
expenditures
All 
households
Only 
households 
reporting OOP 
expenditures
Consumption quintile
  1 (Poorest) 5238 11 396 1490 13 647 7266 13 301
  SE 401 843 165 1411 486 862
  2 5509 11 512 1672 14 361 7805 13 770
  SE 318 625 222 1774 445 738
  3 6942 14 496 1698 15 335 9329 16 191
  SE 560 1072 185 1520 596 980
  4 8684 19 838 2228 18 951 12 191 22 560
  SE 814 1817 414 3197 1062 1941
  5 (Richest) 7619 21 781 1934 20 603 11 728 24 241
  SE 725 2070 331 2904 996 2066
Residence
  Rural 5370 13 229 1407 14 840 7726 15 841
  SE 234 519 105 1082 337 663
  Urban 5900 18 739 1592 18 594 8303 20 630
  SE 490 1506 186 1990 561 1299
  Total 5613 15 409 1492 16 463 7990 17 807
  SE 257 668 102 1056 315 661
Values expressed in Ksh.
outpatient treatment, Ksh 16 463 for inpatient treatment 
and Ksh 17 807 for both types of treatment. On average, 
among this subsample, the higher the total expenditure 
quintile, the more households spent for health services. 
When the overall sample is considered, OOP payments 
are on average higher for those belonging to the richer 
and richest quintiles. In urban areas the average OOP 
health expenditure is 30–40 per cent higher than in rural 
areas. Figure 1 shows that the economic burden of OOP 
payments is inversely proportional to the economic status 
of the households. In particular the burden seems very 
high for the poorest, who spend on average between 10 
and 15 per cent of their budget for healthcare.
Catastrophic healthcare payments
Table 2 shows the estimates of catastrophic expenditures 
measured by the catastrophic HC index and the cata-
strophic payment overshoot (O) for outpatient, inpatient 
and total OOP expenditures disaggregated by expendi-
ture quintiles and location (urban and rural areas). The 
total weighted catastrophic HC is 10.7 when we consider 
the 10 per cent threshold, meaning that 10.7 percentage 
of the population incurs catastrophic health payments. As 
expected this percentage is lower (7.1%) if we consider 
the more restrictive 40 per cent of non- food expendi-
ture threshold. The incidence of catastrophic payments 
is more severe for the poorest households rather than 
wealthier ones and in the rural areas, compared with the 
urban areas. This finding holds true for all outpatient, 
inpatient and total OOP expenditures, but it is stronger 
for the concentration of outpatient expenditures. The 
values of the CI of catastrophic expenditures confirm 
the inequality between rich and poor households: 
CI_E increases with the threshold (−0.06 referred to 
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Table 2 Poverty headcount (HC) index and catastrophic payment overshoot (O), Kenya
Outpatient OOP Inpatient OOP Total OOP
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
HC
Consumption quintile
  1 (Poorest) 12.2 9.9 3.3 2.9 16.2 13.1
  SE 0.0056 0.0053 0.0029 0.0025 0.0065 0.0059
  2 8.2 5.6 1.8 1.6 10.6 7.6
  SE 0.0047 0.0037 0.0021 0.0022 0.0051 0.0041
  3 7.3 4.2 1.9 1.3 9.6 5.9
  SE 0.0056 0.0040 0.0026 0.0020 0.0062 0.0046
  4 6.0 2.7 2.2 1.0 9.0 4.1
  SE 0.0053 0.0031 0.0047 0.0023 0.0079 0.0039
  5 (Richest) 3.5 1.2 1.0 0.3 5.4 1.9
  SE 0.0046 0.0023 0.0026 0.0013 0.0052 0.0028
Residence
  Rural 7.9 5.7 2.1 1.6 10.9 7.9
  SE 0.0028 0.0025 0.0013 0.0012 0.0033 0.0029
  Urban 6.7 3.2 2.0 1.1 9.2 4.5
  SE 0.0045 0.0030 0.0026 0.0016 0.0051 0.0033
  Total 7.3 4.7 2.0 1.4 10.1 6.4
  SE 0.0026 0.0020 0.0013 0.0010 0.0029 0.0023
  CI_E −0.05 −0.08 −0.01 −0.02 −0.06 −0.10
  Weighted total HC 7.7 5.0 2.0 1.4 10.7 7.1
Overshoot (O)
Consumption quintile
  1 (Poorest) 7.7 30.9 1.9 5.1 10.9 43.9
  SE 0.0124 0.0704 0.0032 0.0084 0.0143 0.1071
  2 2.0 5.6 0.8 3.1 3.1 9.8
  SE 0.0020 0.0070 0.0013 0.0076 0.0029 0.0118
  3 1.7 4.0 0.4 1.2 2.4 6.0
  SE 0.0023 0.0069 0.0006 0.0041 0.0027 0.0092
  4 1.1 2.4 0.3 0.6 1.8 3.8
  SE 0.0015 0.0067 0.0007 0.0017 0.0021 0.0077
  5 (Richest) 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.8
  SE 0.0007 0.0015 0.0003 0.0003 0.0010 0.0019
Residence
  Rural 3.3 12.3 0.8 2.6 4.7 17.8
  SE 0.0043 0.0240 0.0011 0.0040 0.0047 0.0366
  Urban 1.5 3.2 0.5 1.1 2.5 5.4
  SE 0.0016 0.0043 0.0010 0.0025 0.0032 0.0071
  Total 2.5 8.4 0.6 2.0 3.6 12.5
  SE 0.0026 0.0140 0.0007 0.0026 0.0028 0.0213
  CI_O −0.52 −0.76 −0.50 −0.72 −0.50 −0.76
  Weighted total O 3.8 14.9 1.0 3.4 5.5 22.1
Continued
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Outpatient OOP Inpatient OOP Total OOP
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
The weighted total is obtained multiplying the payment overshoot (O) and the HC index by the complement of the respective concentration 
index.
CI_E, concentration index for the catastrophic expenditures; CI_O, concentration index for the overshoot.
Table 2 Continued
10% expenditure threshold and −0.10 referred to 40% 
expenditure threshold), meaning greater inequalities 
between poorest and richest for higher thresholds.
All the concentration indices are negative, suggesting 
that catastrophic expenditures are concentrated among 
the poor.
The overshoot index (ie, the extent to which house-
hold health payments exceed the threshold) is positive 
for all categories considered. On average, OOP health 
expenditure for all households is 5.5 per cent higher than 
the threshold (based on 10% of the household expendi-
tures threshold). Similarly, the corresponding value for 
the 40 per cent non- food expenditures is 22.1 per cent. 
These values drop to 3.8 per cent and 14.9 per cent when 
only outpatient OOP are considered and 1 per cent and 
3.4 per cent when only impatient are considered.
The overshoot index largely differs by expenditure 
quintiles, especially for outpatient treatments: the poorest 
pay 30.9 per cent more than the 40 per cent threshold, 
whereas the richest only pay 0.5 per cent more. This 
difference is smaller for OOP of inpatient treatments 
where the index is equal to 0.1 for the poor and 5.1 for 
the rich.
Table 3 shows results for the four selected counties. 
When looking at the total OOP payments, the proportion 
of people experiencing catastrophic payments in Isiolo 
(9.5% and 7.2% in the first and second model, respec-
tively) is comparable to the national average. Kisumu 
reports the highest percentage of people experiencing 
catastrophic payments (19.6% and 14.5% in the first and 
second model, respectively), while Machakos reports the 
lowest percentage (7.6% and 5.2% in the first and second 
model, respectively). Nyeri reports values slightly higher 
than the national average (16% and 10.2% in the first and 
second model, respectively). The highest value in Mach-
akos is driven by outpatient visits while Nyeri reports the 
highest values of catastrophic payments due to inpatient 
treatments. On average, Machakos (1.8% and 7.2% in 
the first and second model), and Isiolo (3.8% and 8.4%) 
show a lower overshoot index while Kisumu (7.4% and 
28.6%) and Nyeri (11.9% and 24.5%) record the highest 
values for the same index.
Impoverishing effect of out-of-pocket expenditure
Table 4 shows results for the impoverishment effect. 
Before making any health- related payments, 46.9 per 
cent of individuals were already living below the national 
poverty line in the rural areas and 41.2 per cent in the 
urban areas. After accounting for OOP payments, the 
poverty head count increased by 2.2 percentage points 
in both rural and urban areas. Therefore, our estimates 
suggest that between 1 and 1.1 million individuals were 
pushed into poverty due to OOP payments.
Before accounting for OOP payments, the monthly 
poverty gap, that is, the average deficit to reach the 
poverty line, was Khs 1306 in rural areas and Khs 2557 
in urban areas. After accounting for OOP payments, the 
average deficit increased by Khs 124 in rural areas and 
Khs 113 in urban areas.
Table 5 reports the same indicators computed for the 
four counties. Remarkable differences for the urban and 
rural areas are evident in all the four counties analysed. 
Kisumu shows poverty levels for the rural areas (48.6%) 
in line with the national average (46.9%), and definitely 
higher levels for the urban areas (65.4% compared with 
an average of 41.9%). The poverty HC net of health 
payments increased by 4.3 percentage points in rural areas 
and only 1.3 percentage points in urban areas. In Mach-
akos the disparities were even more noteworthy: 22.9 per 
cent of individuals in rural areas lived under the poverty 
line and 51.9 per cent in urban areas, with an increase of 
0.8 and 4.3 percentage points after accounting for health 
payments, in both areas, respectively. Nyeri also showed 
substantial heterogeneity between rural and urban areas, 
but in the opposite direction, with poverty levels in urban 
areas almost three times higher than in rural ones. The 
increase in poverty after health payments remained 
the same in both areas; 2.8 and 2.9 percentage points. 
Finally, Isiolo showed the highest level of poverty in rural 
areas (54.2% before and 57.4% after health payments) 
and a lower level (48.5% before and 50.6% after health 
payments) in the urban areas.
Figure 2 is a Pen’s Parade graphical representation 
of the impoverishing effect due to the OOP payments. 
Both rural and urban areas are represented, respectively 
on the right and on the left side. The horizontal axis 
represents households ranked according to their total 
expenditure before any healthcare related payments. 
The graph shows households’ distribution according to 
their expenditures pre- OOP (curve line) and post- OOP 
healthcare payments (vertical lines) as multiple of the 
poverty line. The horizontal lines represent the poverty 
line. When the curve line lies under the poverty line, 
the household is already below it before considering 
any OOP payments. On the contrary, any time that the 
curve line lies above the poverty line and the respective 
vertical line encounters the poverty line, the household 
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Table 3 Poverty headcount (HC) index and catastrophic payment overshoot (O), Kisumu, Machakos, Isiolo and Nyeri districts
Outpatient OOP Inpatient OOP Total OOP
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
10% of tot 
exp
40% of non- 
food exp
Kisumu
HC 14.3 10.3 2.0 1.7 17.1 12.2
SE 0.0250 0.0097 0.0071 0.0071 0.0276 0.0206
CI_E −0.14 −0.37 −0.01 −0.02 −0.15 −0.19
Weighted total HC 16.3 14.1 2.0 1.7 19.6 14.5
Overshoot (O)
Total 4.2 14.3 0.9 2.8 5.4 17.8
SE 0.0177 0.0437 0.0055 0.0185 0.0108 0.0485
CI_O −0.45 −0.69 −0.02 −0.23 −0.37 −0.61
Weighted total O 6.0 24.0 0.9 3.4 7.4 28.6
Machakos
HC 5.5 4.1 1.8 0.9 7.8 5.0
SE 0.0115 0.0083 0.0057 0.0039 0.0157 0.0098
CI_E 0.00 −0.03 0.02 −0.01 0.03 −0.03
Weighted total HC 5.5 4.2 1.7 0.9 7.6 5.2
Overshoot (O)
Total 1.1 2.0 0.4 2.1 1.8 4.6
SE 0.0027 0.0052 0.0029 0.0154 0.0043 0.0191
CI_O 0.11 −0.30 −0.69 −0.94 −0.05 −0.55
Weighted total O 1.0 2.5 0.7 4.1 1.8 7.2
Isiolo
HC 9.0 6.5 1.6 0.7 9.6 6.9
SE 0.0240 0.0173 0.0092 0.0044 0.0241 0.0174
CI_E 0.00 −0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.05
Weighted total HC 8.9 6.8 1.6 0.7 9.5 7.2
Overshoot (O)
Total 2.9 5.6 0.2 0.3 3.3 6.4
SE 0.0114 0.0225 0.0013 0.0014 0.0133 0.0252
CI_O −0.2 −0.3 0.0 −0.2 −0.1 −0.3
Weighted total O 3.3 7.6 0.3 0.3 3.8 8.4
Nyeri
HC 8.2 4.6 3.5 2.5 14.7 8.8
SE 0.0147 0.0080 0.0089 0.0063 0.0180 0.0102
CI_E −0.1 −0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 −0.2
Weighted total HC 8.6 5.1 3.7 2.7 16.0 10.2
Overshoot (O)
Total 2.8 5.9 2.6 3.7 6.8 13.3
SE 0.0099 0.0271 0.0182 0.0209 0.0234 0.0486
CI_O −0.7 −0.9 −0.9 −0.8 −0.8 −0.8
Weighted total O 4.8 11.0 4.9 6.8 11.9 24.5
The weighted total is obtained multiplying the payment overshoot (O) and the HC index by the complement of the respective concentration 
index.
CI_E, concentration index for the catastrophic expenditures; CI_O, concentration index for the overshoot.
copyright.
 o
n
 January 21, 2020 at Basel University. Protected by
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001809 on 24 November 2019. Downloaded from 
8 Salari P, et al. BMJ Global Health 2019;4:e001809. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001809
BMJ Global Health
Table 4 Poverty head count and poverty gap before and after OOP payments, Kenya
Kenya
Gross of health payments Net of health payments Difference
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Poverty headcount (%) 46.9 41.9 49.1 44.1 2.2 2.2
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Poverty gap (Ksh) 1306 2557 1430 2670 124 113
SE 16.6 53.7 19.7 58.5
Normalised poverty gap (%) 40 43 44 45 – –
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Normalised mean positive poverty gap (%) 27.8 61.1 29.1 60.5 – –
Values expressed in Ksh.
is pushed into poverty due to the OOP payments. The 
figure shows that, especially in rural areas, many house-
holds were pushed into poverty also at the right tail of the 
ranking, suggesting that impoverishment is an issue not 
only for the poorest but also for the high- middle income 
population.
As an additional check we estimated the extent to 
which health insurance and subsidies reduce cata-
strophic payments, that is, the financial protection effects 
of health insurance and subsidies. Figure 3 shows gross 
and net OOP payments, where the difference between 
the two is that the latter includes only cash payments 
made by households, while the former also includes the 
disbursements paid by the health insurance or reim-
bursed through subsidies. The difference between the 
two indicators can be attributed to the financial protec-
tion effect of health insurance and subsidy policy. The 
figure suggests that health insurance protected the richer 
more than for the poor. Indirectly, it also shows that the 
absolute value of OOP payments was on average higher 
for richer households.
Measuring the determinants of catastrophic health care 
expenditures
Table 6 reveals what household characteristics are asso-
ciated with the probability of incurring catastrophic 
expenditures for health. Results suggest that the char-
acteristics of the head of the household were generally 
not significantly correlated with the probability of incur-
ring catastrophic expenditure, with the only exception of 
education. Age was not associated with OOP payments, 
while the effect of the sex of the head of the household 
is less clear. A female head was positively correlated with 
the probability of incurring catastrophic expenditure for 
the indicator referring to 10% of total budget (OR=1.1) 
but slightly negatively correlated with the indicator refer-
ring to 40% of non- food expenditure (OR=0.9).
Among the households’ characteristics, the presence 
of one or more members suffering from chronic diseases 
(OR=2.4) and the presence of one or more elderly 
people in the household (OR=1.5) were positively associ-
ated with the probability of incurring catastrophic expen-
diture. The estimates show also an income gradient: the 
richer the household, the less likely it was to incur cata-
strophic payments. Similarly, the bigger the household, 
the lower the probability to incur catastrophic payments. 
The presence of at least one member in the household 
covered by health insurance as well as living in an urban 
area (OR=1.1 for both variables) were slightly positively 
correlated with catastrophic payments, but the correla-
tion was significant only for the indicator referring to 
10% of total budget.
dISCuSSIon
Using a 40 per cent non- food expenditure threshold, 
we found that 7.1 per cent of the Kenyan households 
incurred catastrophic health payments in 2018. When 
10 per cent of total consumption is used as threshold, 
the percentage of households that incurred catastrophic 
payments increased to 10.7 per cent. Due to different 
methodological choices, it is not possible to directly 
compare our results with those from previous studies. 
Yet, some considerations on general trends can be made.
Studies based on previous waves of the KHHEUS 
survey and using the 40 per cent non- food expenditure 
as threshold estimated the level of catastrophic health 
expenditure at 14.8 per cent17 and 9.8 per cent in 200716 
and 6.6 per cent in 2013.18 These estimates seem to 
suggest that while financial protection improved between 
2007 and 2013, over the period 2013–2018 the trend has 
halted. A similar finding arises in terms of the number 
of people pushed into poverty which decreased from 
1.5 million people in 200717 to less than half million people 
in 2013,18 and increased again to 1 million in 2018. This 
emphasises a negative trend in terms of progress in finan-
cial health protection, which is also confirmed looking at 
the share of the population pushed into poverty: about 
4% for 2007, 1% for 2013 and 2% for 2018.
This finding could be explained by the fact that the 
removal of user fees at health centres and dispensaries 
enacted in 2013 gave access to care to people who were 
previously not seeking care. By doing so, more people 
experienced health expenditure related to transport, 
drugs, and higher level of care when referral was needed.
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Table 5 Poverty head count and poverty gap before and after OOP payments, Kisumu, Machakos, Isiolo and Nyeri districts
Gross of health payments Net of health payments Difference
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Kisumu
Poverty headcount (%) 48.6 65.4 52.9 66.7 4.3 1.3
SE 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01
Poverty gap (Ksh) 1536 3077 1798 3193 262 116
SE 155 179 132 193
Normalised poverty gap (%) 47.3 51.3 55.3 53.3 – –
SE 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
Normalised mean positive poverty gap (%) 31.6 47.0 34.0 47.9 – –
Machakos
Poverty HC (%) 22.9 51.9 23.8 56.1 0.8 4.3
SE 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01
Poverty gap (Ksh) 942 2041 971 2130 29 90
SE 142 159 137 192
Normalised poverty gap (%) 29.0 34.0 29.9 35.5 – –
SE 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Normalised mean positive poverty gap (%) 41.1 39.4 40.9 38.0 – –
Isiolo
Poverty headcount (%) 54.2 48.5 57.4 50.6 3.2 2.1
SE 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01
Poverty gap (Ksh) 1352 2268 1481 2441 130 173
SE 52 194 76 110
Normalised poverty gap (%) 41.6 37.8 45.6 40.7 – –
SE 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Normalised mean positive poverty gap (%) 25.0 46.7 25.8 48.2 – –
Nyeri
Poverty HC (%) 14.3 39.5 17.1 42.4 2.8 2.9
SE 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01
Poverty gap (Ksh) 1026 2072 1206 2377 180 305
SE 115 218 133 350
Normalised poverty gap (%) 31.5 34.6 37.1 39.6 – –
SE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06
Normalised mean positive poverty gap (%) 71.7 52.5 70.7 56.0 – –
Figure 2 Effect of OOP expenditures on household consumption distribution in urban and rural areas. PL, poverty line.
copyright.
 o
n
 January 21, 2020 at Basel University. Protected by
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001809 on 24 November 2019. Downloaded from 
10 Salari P, et al. BMJ Global Health 2019;4:e001809. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001809
BMJ Global Health
Figure 3 Gross and net (of health insurance 
reimbursements and subsidies) OOP expenditures (in Khs).
Table 6 Probability of incurring catastrophic healthcare 
expenditures
(1) (2)
Prob. of 
catastrophic exp.
Prob. of 
catastrophic exp.
(10% of tot exp)
(40% of non- food 
exp)
Head of the 
household
Age group
15–24 1 1
25–34 1.020 1.139
(0.125) (0.179)
35–44 0.828 0.963
(0.104) (0.153)
45–54 0.956 0.997
(0.122) (0.161)
55+ 1.048 1.252
(0.138) (0.206)
Female head 1.125∗ 0.980
(0.0607) (0.0636)
Education
No or less than 
primary
1 1
(.) (.)
Primary 1.045 1.038
(0.0659) (0.0736)
Secondary 1.038 0.823∗
(0.0782) (0.0740)
Tertiary 0.929 0.679∗∗
(0.0990) (0.0957)
Employment status
Formal employment 1 1
(.) (.)
Informal employment 1.062 1.047
(0.0863) (0.112)
Not employed 0.931 0.941
(0.0821) (0.107)
Marital status
Never married 1 1
(.) (.)
Married/living 
together
1.202 1.178
Widowed 1.123 1.258
(0.129) (0.181)
Consumption 
quintiles
1 Poorer 1 1
(.) (.)
2 0.665∗∗∗(0.0367) 0.617∗∗∗ (0.0380)
Continued
The additional reforms undertaken between 2013 and 
2018 (eg, coverage of outpatient treatments by NHIF 
initiated in 2015) did not have a meaningful impact 
in terms of financial protection, likely due to the small 
percentage of population covered by the health insur-
ance and health profile of its members.
In our analysis we found evidence of continued dispar-
ities between poor and rich. Figure 1 showed a regressive 
pattern in terms of the share of OOP on total budget, and 
all the indicators of OOP and impoverishment remarked 
this disparity. It is notable that the overshoot indicator for 
outpatient visits indicated that the poorest households 
exceeded the catastrophic threshold by 30 per cent, while 
the richer ones by less than 1 per cent. Moreover, figure 2 
shows that many people were further pushed below the 
poverty line. This is particularly worrisome since health 
payments can trigger a poverty trap mechanism: rather 
than helping the worst- off to exit their poverty condition, 
the health system is indirectly anchoring them to it. This 
phenomenon is even exacerbated by the fact that poor 
people are generally the ones more in need of care.
Indicators reported in table 2 also show large differ-
ences among outpatient and inpatient services. Both 
the poverty HC and overshoot indicators for outpatient 
services were about three times higher than for inpa-
tient services. As many as 5 per cent of the households 
who used outpatient services experienced catastrophic 
expenditures (exceeding the 40% non- food expenditure 
threshold by 14.9%) compared with 1.4 per cent of those 
who used inpatient services (and exceeded the threshold 
by 3.4%). This result suggests outpatient treatments are 
the primary cause of catastrophic payments and impover-
ishment. A plausible explanation for this finding is that 
poorer people, discouraged by user fees at higher level 
of care, choose not to seek care.15 Data from the same 
survey indeed show that the percentage of sick people 
not seeking care increased from 13 per cent in 2013 to 
28 per cent in 2018, with a higher proportion in rural 
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(1) (2)
Prob. of 
catastrophic exp.
Prob. of 
catastrophic exp.
(10% of tot exp)
(40% of non- food 
exp)
3 0.541∗∗∗(0.0332) 0.444∗∗∗(0.0317)
4 0.444∗∗∗(0.0312) 0.308∗∗∗(0.0268)
5 Richer 0.292∗∗∗(0.0262) 0.174∗∗∗(0.0211)
Any insured in the 
HH
1.123∗ 1.101
(0.0605) (0.0735)
Any chronic in the 
HH
2.476∗∗∗(0.105) 2.322∗∗∗(0.117)
Elderly in the HH 1.482∗∗∗(0.0952) 1.510∗∗∗(0.112)
Household size
Group 1 (smaller) 1 1
(.) (.)
Group 2 1.001 0.815∗∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0489)
Group 3 (bigger) 0.954 0.722∗∗∗
(0.0618) (0.0544)
Urban 1.152∗∗ 1.070
(0.0612) (0.0665)
Observations 31 008 30 826
Results expressed in ORs.
Exponentiated coefficients; SE in parentheses. ∗p<0.05, 
∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001.
Both models include county dummies to better control for 
geographical heterogeneity.
Table 6 Continued
areas. Also, self- medication increased from 30.7 per cent 
in 2013 to 45.2 per cent in 2018.19
Our results also highlighted disparities between urban 
and rural areas, the latter scoring overall higher values of 
catastrophic payments and impoverishment indicators. 
This is in line with previous results17 and can be traced 
back to a higher concentration of poorer households in 
rural areas (in absolute values).
The study also showed large heterogeneity across coun-
ties. The association between higher average income 
and lower catastrophic expenditure levels held true also 
at the county level. Nyeri, the second richest county, 
had the lowest level of catastrophic health expenditure 
and impoverishment indicators, while Isiolo, one of 
the poorest counties, showed high values of the same 
indicators.
Based on these findings, some hypothesis can be made 
regarding the expected impact of the UHC initiative on 
catastrophic payments and impoverishment indicators. 
We expect limited impact on the richer counties (eg, 
Nyeri) and more marked reductions in poverty levels 
in middle (eg, Machakos) or middle- poor counties (eg, 
Kisumu), where a larger number of households are 
currently pushed into poverty by health expenditure. 
We also expect an impact on the poorest counties (eg, 
Nyeri), but smaller than middle- rich counties, due to 
the large proportion of household not seeking care and 
therefore not included in the impoverishment indicators. 
On the other hand, the positive impact of an extended 
UHC might be mitigated since patients now affording 
healthcare services might incur higher OOP payments, 
such as transport and drugs related costs (especially for 
the outpatient services).
The results from the regression showed that among the 
demographic characteristics of the head of the house-
hold, only education was significantly and negatively 
correlated with the probability of incurring catastrophic 
health payments. Among the household’ characteris-
tics, the presence of one or more people suffering from 
chronic diseases, and the presence of one or more elderly 
people in the household, were positively associated with 
the probability of incurring catastrophic expenditure. 
Intuitively, more need for healthcare translates into 
higher probability of incurring catastrophic payments. 
The results also showed that the richer the household, 
the less likely it is that they incur catastrophic payments. 
Similarly, the bigger the household, the lower was the 
probability to incur catastrophic payments. This result 
might seem counterintuitive and differs from previous 
results for Kenya18 but is confirmed by similar findings 
for Peru28 and Ghana.29 The results also suggested that 
living in urban areas was positively correlated with the 
probability of incurring catastrophic payments (but statis-
tically significant only for the indicator referring to 10% 
of total budget). This confirms that, when controlling for 
income, there is a higher proportion of sick people not 
seeking care in rural areas, probably due to barriers to 
access care.
Finally, a particularly noteworthy result is that the pres-
ence of at least one member in the household covered 
by health insurance was positively correlated with cata-
strophic payments (but statistically significant only for the 
indicator referring to 10% of total budget), confirming 
previous evidence that health insurance coverage is not 
positively associated with financial protection.5 30
Overall, our results indicate that interventions imple-
mented so far to secure financial risk protection are 
not sufficient. OOP expenditures are the most regres-
sive source of healthcare financing,3 therefore addi-
tional investments are needed to ensure a progressive 
healthcare financing system. Potential interventions to 
improve financial risk protection include more elabo-
rated targeting approaches of people in need (eg, poor, 
chronic patients) and the inclusion of additional drugs 
in the benefit package. However, additional evidence is 
needed to better disentangle the causes of OOP payments 
and thus identify programme that can effectively reduce 
the risk of catastrophic spending.
This study presents some limitations. First, by their 
definition, the indicators computed capture the effects 
of illness and healthcare use on poverty only for those 
households whose members seek care. While it is safe 
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to assume that household are at higher risk of poverty if 
their members fall ill but do not seek care, we cannot esti-
mate the magnitude of this effect. Second, we calculated 
yearly expenditures for outpatient services by extrapo-
lating the expenses incurred over the 4 weeks prior to 
the time of the interview to the entire year, relying on the 
assumption that they are homogeneous. In settings where 
seasonal fluctuations in healthcare expenditure can be 
expected, for example, due to meteorological condi-
tions or cyclical economic activity patterns, this assump-
tion could not hold true. The KHHEUS was conducted 
during the rainy season (April to May) a time preceding 
the harvest (and the relative earnings) and possibly asso-
ciated with an increased prevalence of malaria and other 
common diseases often translating in higher healthcare 
needs.31 Finally, opportunity costs of sick people, such as 
lost earnings, are not included. Yet, the risk of poverty 
might be undervalued if income lost during illness, such 
as limitations in labour participation, are not included.
ConCluSIon
Kenya is still lagging behind in terms of protecting its citi-
zens against financial risks associated with ill health and 
healthcare seeking behaviour. As our results show, 7.1 per 
cent of the Kenyan households incurred catastrophic 
health payments in 2018. While the percentage of house-
holds being financially affected by health payments has 
been decreasing since 2003, the health system reforms 
implemented over the last 5 years (2013–2018) did not 
succeed in preventing households from experiencing 
catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures. If 
Kenya is to achieve UHC by 2022, different interventions 
are needed to protect the most vulnerable population 
groups—both in terms of socioeconomic characteris-
tics and health status—from costs of illness. As previous 
evidence has shown, expanding health insurance may 
enhance access to care but often fails to protect people 
from financial hardship related to healthcare. The 
recently launched UHC initiative aims at increasing 
access to inpatient care by removing user fees at hospi-
tals. By providing county level results, this study set up 
the baseline to monitor changes in financial protection 
in the four UHC pilot counties and in subsequent scale 
up counties.
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